Students on a theater trip in Iceland.
Much has been written on the constitutional overhaulin Israel,and the attendant constitutional crisis in the first nine months of 2023. Since October 7, however,with the breakout of the Israel-Gaza war,the overhaul was seemingly shelved. This Article seeks to connect both events, bycomparingthe legal-political response to the overhaul with the legal-political response to the war. It asks why, given the intensity of the protest movement generated by the overhaul, there was a dearth of protest activity after the war, even though both events implicated similar values, namely the rule of law and individual rights, championed by the protest movement. I argue thatacentral reason for the disparity cannot only be explained by the dynamics of war, butalsodue to the tensions and complexities inherent in Israels self-professed constitutional identity as a Jewish and democratic state.In particular, I argue that anti-overhaul protestsappealed to liberal universalist values in order togarner bipartisan support, with the effect of bypassingsubstantive issues such as the occupation of the Palestinian Territories and discrimination faced by Israeli Palestinians. This explains the lack of Arab participation in the protests, as many perceived them to be an internal Jewish Affair. Thus, when post-war repressive measures mostly affected Israeli Palestinians,theprotestmovementfailed torally in their support. Although anti-overhaul protests could have brought about greater liberal consolidation in Israel,the relative lack of post-war mobilization castslingering doubts on the possibility of long-term consolidation of liberal values in Israel. Attempts to depoliticize the protests, while perhaps successful in warding off the overhaul, and though impressive on their own, have likely failed in instilling deeper, more resilient, liberal values in Israel.
Registration:泭